Industry executives and experts share their predictions for 2025. Read them in this 17th annual VMblog.com series exclusive. By
Josh Bressers, VP of Security at Anchore
In recent years, we've witnessed the
software supply chain transition from a quiet corner of cybersecurity into a
primary battlefield. Today, cybercriminals have fully embraced the hidden
complexity of software supply chains as a ripe vector to exploit.
SBOMs are an inventory of the complex
dependencies that make up modern applications. SBOMs help organizations scale
vulnerability management and automate compliance enforcement-among other
things. The end goal is to increase transparency in an organization's supply
chain where 70-90% of modern applications are open source software
(OSS) dependencies. This significant source of risk demands a
proactive, data-driven solution
Software
Bills of Materials (SBOMs) have emerged as a focal point to achieve
visibility and accountability in a software ecosystem that will only grow more
complex. Looking ahead to 2025, we at Anchore, see 3 trends emerging in the area of
software supply chain security:
- Supply chain attacks continue their rapid acceleration
- Global
regulatory bodies continue to steadily drive SBOM adoption
- Foundational software ecosystems begin to implement build-native
SBOM support
Supply Chain Attacks Continue to
Accelerate
Software supply chain attacks have a long
history, but their magnitude and frequency kept them from reaching mainstream
consciousness until recently. In 2017, the NotPetya attack foreshadowed the era
of high-profile supply chain exploits. The turning point arrived in 2020 with
the SolarWinds Orion breach which demonstrated the massive blast radius that
has become the defining feature of prominent supply chain attacks. A single
compromised vendor not only incurs the damages of a security breach; the impact
ripples across their entire customer base and the industry as a whole.
The numbers don't lie: from 2019 to 2022,
software supply chain attacks saw a staggering 540% year-over-year growth. On top of that, it
is estimated these attacks will cause $80.6 billion in damages by 2026. Given the
success that adversaries are seeing and the unabated growth of software
complexity, the only rational expectation is that this trend will continue to
accelerate into 2025. As these threats multiply, the security community will
have to respond in kind.
Fortunately, the defensive front isn't
standing still. Instead, they are coalescing around SBOMs as the scalable
solution to software supply chain security.
Global Regulatory Bodies Continue Steady
Adoption of SBOMs
As supply chain attacks surged,
policymakers and standards bodies recognized this new threat vector as a
critical threat with national security implications. To stem the rising tide
supply chain threats, global regulatory bodies have decided that SBOMs are one
of the solutions.
Over the past decade, we've witnessed a
global legislative and regulatory awakening to the utility of SBOMs. Early
attempts like the Cyber Supply Chain Management and Transparency Act of 2014
may have failed to pass, but they paved the way for more significant milestones
to come. The U.S. EO 14028 in 2021 explicitly named SBOMs as the foundation for
a secure software supply chain. The following year the European Union's Cyber
Resilience Act (CRA) pushed SBOMs from the realm of "suggested best practice" to
"expected norm."
Global guidance is not limited to the US
and the EU. Regulators and security agencies worldwide-such as Germany's Office
for Information Security (the BSI), the UK's National Cyber Security Centre,
India's CERT-In, Canada's Centre for Cyber Security, and Australia's ACSC-have
all signaled strong support for SBOM adoption.
This constant pressure ensures that SBOMs
adoption will only continue to grow. It won't be long until they are table
stakes for anyone operating an online business. We expect the steady march
forward of SBOMs to continue in 2025. In fact, this regulatory pressure is
being felt by the foundational ecosystems of the software industry.
Software Ecosystems Trial Build-Native
SBOM Support
Until now, SBOM generation has been relegated to
afterthought in software ecosystems. Businesses scan their internal supply
chains with software composition analysis (SCA) tools; trying to piece together
a picture of their dependencies. But as SBOM adoption continues its upward momentum,
this model is evolving. In 2025, we expect that leading software ecosystems
will promote SBOMs to a first-class citizen and integrate them natively into
their build tools.
Industry experts have recently begun
advocating for this change. Brandon Lum, the SBOM Lead at Google, notes, "The software industry needs to improve build tools
propagating software metadata." Rather than forcing downstream
consumers to infer the software's composition after the fact, producers will
generate SBOMs as part of standard build pipelines. This approach reduces
friction, makes application composition discoverable, and ensures that software
supply chain security is not left behind.
We are already seeing early examples:
- Python Ecosystem: In 2024, Python maintainers explored proposals for build-native SBOM support,
motivated by the regulations such as, the Secure Software Development Framework
(SSDF) and the EU's CRA. They've envisioned a future where projects, package
maintainers, and contributors can easily annotate their code with software
dependency metadata that will automatically propagate at build time.
- Java Ecosystem: The Eclipse Foundation and
VMware's Spring Boot team have introduced plug-ins for Java build tools like
Maven or Gradle that streamline SBOM generation. While not fully native to the
compiler or interpreter, these integrations lower the barrier to SBOM adoption
within mainstream Java development workflows.
In 2025 we won't just be talking about
build-native SBOMs in abstract terms-we'll have experimental support for them
from the most forward thinking ecosystems. This shift is still in its infancy
but it foreshadows the central role that SBOMs will play in the future of
cybersecurity and software development as a whole.
Closing Remarks
The writing on the wall is clear: supply
chain attacks aren't slowing down-they are accelerating. In a world of complex,
interconnected dependencies, every organization must know what's inside its
software to quickly spot and respond to risk. As SBOMs move from a nice-to-have
to a fundamental part of building secure software, teams can finally gain the
transparency they need over every component they use, whether open source or
proprietary. This clarity is what will help them respond to the next Log4j or XZ Utils issue before it spreads, putting
security team's back in the driver's seat and ensuring that software innovation
doesn't come at the cost of increased vulnerability.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Josh Bressers is the Vice President of
Security at Anchore where he manages the Infosec team and guides security
features for the company's commercial and open source solutions. Additionally,
Josh acts as a public security advocate and evangelist, representing Anchore on
topics including DevSecOps best practices, software supply chain security, and
other key cybersecurity initiatives.
Prior to joining Anchore, Josh was
with Elastic where he built the product security team, managed Elastic Stack
supply chain defense, and created an application security program with a strong
emphasis on realistic requirements. Before Elastic, Josh was an early hire to
the Red Hat Security Response Team where he specialized in helping their open
source projects coordinate and disclose vulnerabilities and became the CVE
Numbering Authority for all OSS projects within Red Hat. Later, he founded the
Red Hat Product Security Team which oversaw security for development lifecycles
and the ongoing application security for Red Hat products.
Josh is co-host of the Open Source
Security Podcast and the host/producer of the Cyphercon Hacker History Podcast.
Josh is a member of the OpenSSF technical advisory council, and co-lead of the
OpenSSF SBOM Everywhere project. Josh is also a co-founder of the Global
Security Database project which is a Cloud Security Alliance working group
exploring the future of security vulnerability identifiers.